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We provide evidence that women enter competitions at the same
rate as men when the incentive for winning includes the option to
share part of the rewards with the losers (i.e., when the incentive
system is socially oriented). Using an experiment (with N = 238
subjects from three laboratories), we find that about 16% more
men than women choose to compete in the standard tournament;
this gender gap is eliminated in the socially oriented incentive
treatment. While men’s choice to compete remains unchanged, at
around 52% in both conditions, women increase their entry rate
from 35% in the standard tournament to 60% when the incentive
includes a socially oriented option.
female competitiveness | cooperation | gender wage gap | tournament |
dictator game
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O

ur research investigates one possible reason behind the
finding that women display a lower desire to compete than
men in laboratory experiments (1). We hypothesize that the gap
in competitiveness generally found in tournament experiments
derives from the one-dimensional, money-only payoff structure
traditionally implemented. We design a treatment that varies the
incentive for winning and demonstrate that the introduction of
a socially oriented incentive closes the gender gap in competitiveness. The finding that women choose to compete less than
they should relative to their abilities has been interpreted as
evidence that women are less competitive than men, an idea
advanced as an explanation for the pervasive gender wage gap.
High-earning jobs offer superior, but less predictable, returns,
and are arguably also more competitive. So, if women are less
competitive than men, they are predicted to remain a minority
in high-ranking economic positions. Individual preferences for
competition, which may differ on the basis of sex, are important to investigate because of their implications for an individual’s economic well-being, from career choice to salaries and
promotions.
Our work is motivated by the idea that females—at least in
certain contexts—can be as competitive as males, yet they exhibit
it differently (see ref. 2 for a more detailed account). Here, we
advance the hypothesis that women, rather than having a lower
desire to compete, are motivated to respond to the prosocial
nature of the incentives, as a reflection of their different evolutionary and cultural constraints.*
To men, the principal benefit to winning competitions and
achieving high status, besides uncontested access to resources, is
the greater reproductive opportunities that such resources afford
(4, 5). For women, the benefits accrue differently: Power and
status are important because of the benefits they provide to their
offspring (6). This difference is noticeable in western traditional
gender roles where men are viewed as securers of resources and
women are viewed as distributors of those resources to members
of the family (7). However, there are hidden costs to winning
that women, specifically, face. For women, occupying powerful
* Evidence suggests that, in matrilineal societies, there is no gender difference in compet-

itiveness at any age, whereas, in patriarchal societies, women become less competitive
than men around puberty (3).
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positions in society does not seem to translate into attracting
higher-quality men (8, 9). Women in high-executive positions
and political appointments are more likely to get divorced than
men (10), receive negative reactions from their spouses, and
report lower marital satisfaction (11). For men, in addition to the
reproductive benefits, high status secures male allies. For women,
high status may alienate other women—hence, appearing less
competitive may be a crucial element for securing allies (12, 13).
In summary, women benefit from high status but are aware of
the unique costs associated with it. This suggests that women may
be just as competitive as men, if the incentives involved reflect the
social environment. Here, we focus on one such scenario in which
the prize for winning a tournament includes a social dimension:
Winners have the option to share some of the prize with one of
the losers. This prosocial option, known to the participants ahead
of the competition, may appeal to women who are motivated to
gain control of the distribution of resources or to repair social
connections postcompetition.
We employ a between-subject design in which subjects are randomly assigned to one of two treatments: Baseline or Dictator.
Each treatment consists of three rounds of a real effort task,
the matrix search, under varying payment schemes: a piece rate
per correct answer (round 1), a mandatory tournament where all
subjects experience the competitive environment (round 2), and
a choice between being paid according the piece-rate scheme or
the tournament scheme (round 3). This choice in the last round
is our outcome variable.
In the piece-rate round of both treatments, participants earn a
prize equal to $2 per correct matrix, regardless of how well they
perform relative to others. The tournament round is a winnerstake-all contest similar to the standard design (1). In each session,
participants are randomly matched in groups of four.† Within
each group, the top two performers are winners, and the bottom
two performers are losers. In Baseline, the prize for winners in
the tournament is equal to $4 per correct matrix; losers earn $0.
In Dictator, the prosocial tournament, the prize for winners is
the same as in Baseline except that the winners have the option
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In ref. 1, the participants knew that each group comprised two women and two men.
In our setting, groups were formed randomly and anonymously, so the participants did
not know the gender of those they were competing against, but they could expect
a mix since each session was gender balanced (62% female on average). The random
formation of groups resulted in 82% (51/62) mixed-gender groups and 18% (11/62)
single-sex groups.
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to share some of those gains with one of the losers; losers earn $0
plus what gets shared. Beliefs about their own capabilities relative
to others were elicited by asking participants to guess their rank
following the tournament, and risk preferences were elicited
using the Eckel and Grossman measure (14) (SI Appendix).
Our main hypothesis is that the gender gap in choosing to compete in round 3 will close when the incentive is socially oriented as
in the Dictator treatment, that is, when the tournament includes
a prosocial option.
Results
Fig. 1 depicts our results by displaying the percentage of men
and women who, under each treatment, opt to compete for a
higher prize rather than settling on a piece-rate payment. Our
results support the hypothesis that including a socially oriented
incentive for an otherwise identical tournament closes the gender
gap in competitiveness. First, the data in Baseline replicate the
standard finding: The percentage of males choosing the tournament, 51%, is significantly higher than the percentage of females
choosing the tournament, 34.8% (N = 51, N = 69, respectively;
P = 0.076).‡ Second, in Dictator, when the winners are given
the option to share some of their prize with a loser, the entry
gap closes: 52.5% men enter vs. 60.3% women (N = 40, N =
78, respectively; P = 0.424). Comparing entry rate by gender
across treatments, we observe that women nearly double their
entry rate into the tournament, from 34.8% in Baseline to 60.3%
in Dictator (P = 0.002), while men’s entry rates stay the same,
51% vs. 52.5% (P = 0.887).
How much of this effect is due to different abilities across
genders, risk preferences, and beliefs about abilities (i.e., confidence)? The men in our sample performed better than the
women in the piece-rate payment scheme implemented in round
1 in both treatments (Baseline: 5.75 vs. 4.61, P = 0.021; Dictator: 5.75 vs. 4.55, P = 0.014), suggesting that the task may
be gendered. This bias makes our main result more difficult to
observe and thus suggests that it is robust. While there is a gender
difference in performance in the mandatory tournament (round
2) under Baseline (5.82 vs. 4.93; P = 0.044), the gap closes under
Dictator (5.13 vs. 4.46; P = 0.179), a result that replicates and extends to a choice of entry protocol the findings in ref. 2. In terms

of risk preferences, women are more risk averse than men in both
treatments (P = 0.001). Men and women exhibit similar levels of
overconfidence measured as the difference between their guess
and their actual rank: Baseline, 0.15 vs. 0.02 (P = 0.540); Dictator, −0.06 vs. −0.24 (P = 0.372). Table 1 reports Probit regression results on entry decisions. Model 2 shows that controlling
for these differences in individual abilities (using performance in
the mandatory round 2 tournament), risk preferences, and beliefs
explains some of the gender gap in competitiveness, but leaves
the interaction effect of gender and treatment reported in model
1 largely unchanged and equally significant.§ Separately by sex,
model 3 shows that the treatment does not impact men’s entry
decisions, while model 4 confirms that women increase their
competitiveness with the socially oriented incentive by nearly
33%. There is no difference across laboratories (controlled for
in all specifications).
Does the option to share get exercised more by women than
by men? In round 2 (in Dictator), all subjects record ex ante
how much, if any, of the prize they will share in the event
that they win. Half or more commit to give a positive amount
(62.5% men and 52.6% women, P = 0.306). In round 3, where
the option to share is presented only after winning, fewer
men exercise the option compared to round 2, while women
exercise the option at a similar rate (41.7% men and 52.2%
women, P = 0.568). However, the percent transferred does not
differ across genders in either round 2 (men, 14.9%; women,
15.2%; P = 0.933) or round 3 (men 7.5% vs. women 11.1%;
P = 0.412).¶ This replicates previous work on dictator behavior
where dictators have a property right over the pie (see ref. 15).
Table 1.

Choice to compete

Female
Dictator
Female × Dictator

All
(model 1)
–0.164∗∗
(0.067)
0.026
(0.084)
0.236∗∗
(0.107)

Score in round 2
Risk tolerance

Entry

60%

Overconfidence
Lab controls
N
Log likelihood
Mean dep var

40%

20%

0%
Baseline

Dictator
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Female

The reported P values are from two-sided t tests.
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Male
(model 3)

Female
(model 4)

0.069
(0.092)

0.329∗∗∗
(0.097)

0.029
(0.028)
0.060∗∗
(0.025)
0.101∗
(0.055)
Yes
91
–59.12
0.516

0.046∗∗
(0.017)
0.047∗∗
(0.019)
0.055∗
(0.028)
Yes
147
–90.65
0.483

Probit analysis. Dependent variable = 1 if subject chooses to enter competition, zero otherwise. Marginal effects are reported. Robust SEs clustered
at the session level are reported in parentheses. Lab Controls: Chapman and
Simon Fraser (University of California, Santa Cruz base category). “Mean dep
var” reports the average proportion of subjects choosing to compete.
∗
P < 0.10, ∗∗ P < 0.05, ∗∗∗ P < 0.01.

Male

Fig. 1. Choice to compete. Bars represent the percentage of subjects choosing to compete under each treatment for men (black) and women (gray).
Error bars represent mean ± SE. In Baseline, women choose to compete
at significantly lower rates than men (34.8% vs. 51%, t test P = 0.076).
In Dictator, women choose to compete at rates not significantly different
from men (60.3% vs. 52.5%, t test P = 0.424). While men’s entry remains
unchanged across treatments (t test P = 0.887), women’s entry significantly
increases in the socially oriented treatment (t test P = 0.002).

‡

Yes
238
–159.6
0.496

All
(model 2)
–0.071
(0.080)
0.085
(0.092)
0.245∗∗
(0.106)
0.039∗∗
(0.016)
0.048∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.076∗∗∗
(0.026)
Yes
238
–151.6
0.496

§

Risk preferences have been suggested as a plausible mechanism behind the finding that
women enter the competition in Dictator more often because, even if they lose, they
are likely to receive a share of the winnings, effectively reducing the risk to entry. To
test for a differential effect of risk preferences based on gender, we ran a specification
that includes, in model 2, the interaction between Female and Risk tolerance, and
find that this coefficient is nearly zero and not significant (P = 0.877); importantly,
the interaction coefficient between Female and Dictator remains stable (0.243) and
significant (P = 0.022).

¶

A caveat is that the number of observations in round 3 is lower than in round 2 since
only half of the participants are winners. While the experiment is sufficiently powered
to test the main hypothesis, it is underpowered to restrict the analysis of behavior to
just the winners in round 3.
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Discussion
Our work relates to previous evidence that women enter competitions more when prosocial components are present. In one
study, mothers compete as much as fathers when the rewards
could benefit their children (16). In experiments exploring team
competition, the gender gap closes, with women preferring to
compete as a team and men preferring to compete alone (17, 18).
A key innovation of our research is that it precisely isolates the
prosocial aspect: The pie sizes in Baseline and Dictator are determined in exactly the same way; the only difference is whether
the winner has the option to divide that pie postcompetition.
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We propose that women are not less competitive than men
but are differentially sensitive to the social aspects of the environment. Women face trade-offs associated with earned high
status that men do not face. Competitiveness in women reflects
those personal and societal pressures, intertwining a desire to
compete for resources with concerns about the distribution of
those resources. For navigating cooperation and competition in
the social world, sex matters.
Materials and Methods
All procedures were approved by the Rutgers University and the University
of San Francisco Institutional Review Boards. See SI Appendix for detailed
methods. We employed a between-subject design with two experimental conditions: Baseline (N = 120; 57.50% female) and Dictator (N = 118;
66.10% female), randomized at the session level. The participants were
undergraduate students at Chapman University; University of California,
Santa Cruz; and Simon Fraser University. We obtained signed consent and
guaranteed complete anonymity. They earned a $7 show-up payment and,
on average, earned $11.36 in the matrix search task and $6.25 in the risk
preference task.
Data Availability. The data and Stata do files have been deposited on the
Open Science Framework (19).
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The option to share, even if not fully exercised in this anonymous
environment, still motivates women to compete.
Our results are compatible with several possible motivations:
sharing seen as postcompetition repair and the option to share
being prized for its own sake as control over distribution of
resources. It is plausible that multiple factors are at play, and we
address this in ongoing work. We extend to a choice environment
the involuntary dictator treatments reported in ref. 2 where
dictators are forced to share their prize in two prearranged distributions (one equivalent to the one observed here and the other
50%). If the motivation behind higher competitiveness is about
control of the distribution of resources, women will not choose
to compete as much in either of the involuntary treatments; but,
if the motivation is about appearing less overtly competitive by
making losers a little better off, then women should choose to
compete in the involuntary treatments as much as in Dictator.

